不确定性联盟形成中基于信念的稳定性-智能代理的视角-(英文版) 本书特色

《不角定性联盟形成中基于信念的稳定性:智能代理的视角(英文版)》由陈志江、梁浩锋所著,供相关读者阅读参考。

不确定性联盟形成中基于信念的稳定性-智能代理的视角-(英文版) 内容简介

　　《不确定性联盟形成中基于信念的稳定性（智能代理的视角英文版）》安排如下：在第1章中，我们首先提供在博弈论的话题，在这本书中所讨论的概念有关的介绍。在第2章中，我们回顾了一些相关的文学作品，特别是在合作博弈理论和多agent联盟形成问题。在第3章中，我们将讨论在代理的信念对游戏的稳定性的不确定性的影响。采用以规则为基础的方法和强大的核心和弱核心的概念引入。我们还讨论了信仰联盟的稳定性精度的效果。我们在第4章，不可转让的实用程序（ntu）游戏中引入民间信仰，使代理商的喜好不再是常识。信念精度稳定性的影响也检查

不确定性联盟形成中基于信念的稳定性-智能代理的视角-(英文版) 目录

chapter 1 multi-agent cooperation and stability
1.1 semi-competitive multi-agent systems
1.1.1 characteristics of multi-agent systems
1.1.2 two basic solution concepts of coalition
formations
1.2 coalition formation and game theory
1.2.1 transferable utility games
1.2.2 non-transferable utility games
1.3 problem with the common knowledge assumption
references
chapter 2 non-transferable utility games and
coalition formation mechanisms
2.1 non-transferable utility cooperative games
2.2 transferable utility cooperative games
2.3 coalition formation mechanisms chapter 1  multi-agent cooperation and stability 1.1  semi-competitive multi-agent systems 1.1.1  characteristics of multi-agent systems 1.1.2  two basic solution concepts of coalition formations 1.2  coalition formation and game theory 1.2.1  transferable utility games 1.2.2  non-transferable utility games 1.3  problem with the common knowledge assumption references chapter 2  non-transferable utility games and coalition formation mechanisms 2.1  non-transferable utility cooperative games 2.2  transferable utility cooperative games 2.3  coalition formation mechanisms 2.4  belief and uncertainties references chapter 3  two classes of stability -- strong core and weak core 3.1  coalition formation and stability 3.2  an example 3.3  ntu games with internal uncertainty 3.4  opinions and preferences of agents 3.5  the strong core and the weak core 3.6  effect of refinedness of agent opinions 3.7  application areas 3.8  summary references chapter 4  the b-core： belief-based coalition stability 4.1  games without common knowledge 4.2  belief-based coalitional games 4.3  ntu games with private beliefs 4.4  the core， the b-core and belief accuracy 4.5  discussion 4.6  on dynamic beliefs 4.7  summary references chapter 5  example application of the b-core： buyer coalition problem with beliefs 5.1  buyer coalition problems 5.1.1  are the utility really transferable？ 5.1.2  how about stability？ 5.1.3  private information in buyer coalition 5.1.4  existing approaches 5.1.5  a new approach 5.2  background of buyer coalition problem 5.2.1  unit price schedule and agent preference 5.2.2  agent beliefs 5.2.3  ntu buyer coalition games 5.2.4  properties of the b-core in ntu-buyer games 5.2.5  on mechanism design 5.3  a distributed mechanism 5.3.1  distributed non-transferable utility coalition formation mechanism 5.3.2  an example of the mechanism 5.4  experiment 5.4.1  performance of the mechanism 5.4.2  evidence of incentive compatibility 5.5  summary references chapter 6  the complete picture： sb-core and wb-core 6.1  uncertain opinion and private beliefs 6.2  an illustrating example 6.3  ntu-bu games 6.3.1  preferences and beliefs in ntu-bu games 6.3.2  ntu-bu games stability 6.4  properties 6.4.1  relationships of the four criteria 6.4.2  effect of refinedness 6.4.3  effect of accuracy 6.5  summary references chapter 7  conclusion 7.1  new solution concepts for belief-based ntu games 7.2  the future references book references index

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