中级微观经济学精要:英文版 本书特色

　　《中级微观经济学精要(英文版)》在中级层次上，以微积分为工具，简要介绍了微观经济学的核心概念。作者首先介绍了消费者理论，讨论了偏好和效用、预算约束、消费者的优先选择、需要及消费者的劳动力供给与储蓄决策等，之后介绍了福利经济学，再之后又介绍了企业决策理论，讨论了竞争市场、垄断市场和双寡头市场等的局部均衡，还分析了由外部性、公共品和不对称信息导致的市场失灵，以及不确定性条件下的决策与博弈论等等内容，本书辅以图形分析，有助于学生掌握相关知识。

中级微观经济学精要:英文版 内容简介

本书在中级层次上, 以微积分为工具, 简要介绍了微观经济学的核心概念。作者首先介绍了消费者理论, 讨论了偏好和效用、预算约束、消费者的*优选择、需要及消费者的劳动力供给与储蓄决策等, 之后介绍了福利经济学, 再之后又介绍了企业决策理论, 讨论了竞争市场、垄断市场和双

中级微观经济学精要:英文版 目录

preface1 introductionpart ⅰ theory of the consumer2 preferences and utility　2.1 introduction　2.2 the consumer's preference relation　2.3 the marginal rate of substitution　2.4 the consumer's utility function　2.5 utility functions and the marginal rate of substitution　2.6 a solved problem　exercises appendix. differentiation of functions3 the budget constraint and the consumer's optimal choice　3.1 introduction　3.2 the standard budget constraint, the budget set, and the budget line　3.3 shifts of the budget line　3.4 odd budget constraints　3.5 income and consumption over time　3.6 the consumer's optimal choice: graphical analysis　3.7 the consumer's optimal choice: utility maximization subject to the budget constraint　3.8 two solved problems　exercises　appendix. maximization subject to a constraint: the lagrange function method4 demand functions　4.1 introduction　4.2 demand as a function of income　4.3 demand as a function of price　4.4 demand as a function of price of the other good　4.5 substitution and income effects　4.6 the compensated demand curve　4.7 elasticity　4.8 the market demand curve　4.9 a solved problem　exercises5 supply functions for labor and savings　5.1 introduction to the supply of labor　5.2 choice between consumption and leisure　5.3 substitution and income effects in labor supply　5.4 other types of budget constraints　5.5 taxing the consumer's wages　5.6 saving and borrowing: the intertemporal choice of consumption　5.7 the supply of savings　5.8 a solved problem　exercises6 welfare economics 1: the one-person case　6.1 introduction　6.2 welfare comparison of a per-unit tax and an equivalent lump-sum tax　6.3 rebating a per-unit tax　6.4 measuring a change in welfare for one person　6.5 measuring welfare for many people; a preliminary example　6.6 a solved problem　exercises appendix. revealed preference7 welfare economics 2: the many-person case　7.1 introduction　7.2 quasilinear preferences　7.3 consumer's surplus　7.4 a consumer's surplus example with quasilinear preferences　7.5 consumers' surplus　7.6 a last word on the quasilinearity assumption　7.7 a solved problem　exercisespart ⅱ theory of the producer8 theory of the firm 1: the single-input model　8.1 introduction　8.2 the competitive firm's problem, focusing on its output　8.3 the competitive firm's problem, focusing on its input　8.4 multiple outputs　8.5 a solved problem　exercises9 theory of the firm 2: the long-run, multiple-input model　9.1 introduction　9.2 the production function in the long run　9.3 cost minimization in the long run　9.4 profit maximization in the long run　9.5 a solved problem　exercises10 theory of the firm 3: the short-run, multiple-input model　10.1 introduction　10.2 the production function in the short run　10.3 cost minimization in the short run　10.4 profit maximization in the short run　10.5 a solved problem　exercisespart ⅲ partial equilibrium analysis: market structure11 perfectly competitive markets　11.1 introduction　11.2 perfect competition　11.3 market/industry supply　11.4 equilibrium in a competitive market　11.5 competitive equilibrium and social surplus maximization　11.6 the deadweight loss of a per-unit tax　11.7 a solved problem　exercises12 monopoly and monopolistic competition　12.1 introduction　12.2 the classical solution to monopoly　12.3 deadweight loss from monopoly: comparing monopoly and competition　12.4 price discrimination　12.5 monopolistic competition　12.6 a solved problem　exercises13 duopoly　13.1 introduction　13.2 cournot competition　13.3 more on dynamics　13.4 collusion　13.5 stackelberg competition　13.6 bertrand competition　13.7 a solved problem　exercises14 game theory　14.1 introduction　14.2 the prisoners' dilemma, and the idea of dominant strategy equilibrium　14.3 prisoners' dilemma complications: experimental evidence and repeated games　14.4 the battle of the sexes, and the idea of nash equilibrium　14.5 battle of the sexes complications: multiple or no nash equilibria, and mixed strategies　14.6 the expanded battle of the sexes, when more choices make players worse off　14.7 sequential move games　14.8 threats　14.9 a solved problem　exercisespart iv general equilibrium analysis15 an exchange economy　15.1 introduction　15.2 an economy with two consumers and two goods　15.3 pareto efficiency　15.4 competitive or walrasian equilibrium　15.5 the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics　15.6 a solved problem　exercises16 a production economy　16.1 introduction　16.2 a robinson crusoe production economy　16.3 pareto efficiency　16.4 walrasian or competitive equilibrium　16.5 when there are two goods, bread and rum　16.6 the two welfare theorems revisited　16.7 a solved problem　exercisespart v market failure17 externalities　17.1 introduction　17.2 examples of externalities　17.3 the oil refiner and the fish farm　17.4 classical solutions to the externality problem: pigou and coase　17.5 modern solutions for the externality problem: markets　for pollution rights　17.6 modern solutions for the externality problem: cap and trade　17.7 a solved problem　exercises18 public goods　18.1 introduction　18.2 examples of public goods　18.3 a simple model of an economy with a public good　18.4 the samuelson optimality condition　18.5 the free rider problem and voluntary contribution　mechanisms　18.6 how to get efficiency in economies with public goods　18.7 a solved problem　exercises19 uncertainty and expected utility　19.1 introduction and examples　19.2 von neumann-morgenstern expected utility: preliminaries　19.3 von neumann-morgenstern expected utility:　assumptions and conclusion　19.4 von neumann-morgenstern expected utility: examples　19.5 a solved problem　exercises20 uncertainty and asymmetric information　20.1 introduction　20.2 when sellers know more than buyers: the market for "lemons"　20.3 when buyers know more than sellers: a market for health insurance　20.4 when insurance encourages risk taking: moral hazard　20.5 the principal-agent problem　20.6 what should be done about market failures caused by asymmetric information　20.7 a solved problem　exercisesindex

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